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This paper explores whether unconventional monetary policy oper-
ations have redistributive effects on household wealth. Drawing on
household balance sheet data from the Wealth and Asset Survey,
we construct monthly time series indicators on the distribution of
different asset types held by British households for the period that the
monetary policy switched as the policy rate reached the zero lower
bound (2006-2016). Using this series, we estimate the response of
wealth inequalities on monetary policy, taking into account the effect
of unconventional policies conducted by the Bank of England in
response to the Global Financial Crisis. Our evidence reveals that
unconventional monetary policy shocks have significant long-lasting
effects on wealth inequality: an expansionary monetary policy in the
form of asset purchases raises wealth inequality across households,
as measured by their Gini coefficients of net wealth, housing wealth,
and financial wealth. The evidence of our analysis helps to raise
awareness of central bankers about the redistributive effects of their
monetary policy decisions.
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1. Introduction
The 2007-08 financial crisis led to a profound shift in monetary policy. As policy rates
reached the zero-lower bound (ZLB), central banks employed unconventional policies aimed
at boosting nominal spending, increasing the liquidity of the financial system, and reaching
their inflation targets. Unconventional policies played a significant role in alleviating the
impact of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), but also triggered policy concerns that QE
measures can have large effects on economic inequalities (Casiraghi et al., 2018; Colciago
et al., 2019). Over the last 15 years, Great Britain witnessed increasing levels of wealth
inequality (Alvaredo et al., 2018). The share of the net wealth of the richest 10% of the
population accounts for almost 50% of the country’s total net wealth (Figure 1a), while
overall wealth inequality increased by more than 4% from 2006 to 2016 (Figure 1b). Although
there is by now a growing literature exploring the relationship between monetary policy
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2 DECEMBER 2019
and income inequality,1 little research has focused on the impact of monetary policy on
wealth inequalities.2 Yet, monetary policy, and particularly unconventional measures, can
influence household wealth shares by re-valuating and re-balancing their portfolios through
different transmission channels (O’Farrell and Rawdanowicz, 2017; Colciago et al., 2019).
Understanding the impact of monetary policy on wealth inequalities is important for policy-
makers because wealth is associated with households’ financial health, it reflects households’
future well-being, it is associated with political power (Cowell and Van Kerm, 2015), but also
because wealth disparities imply heterogeneous consumption elasticities which can function
as a transmission mechanism of monetary policy themselves (Kaplan et al., 2018; Auclert,
2019; Arrondel et al., 2019).
Figure 1. Wealth Inequality in Great Britain (2006-2016)
(a) Shares of Net Wealth for different household
deciles
(b) Evolution of Net Wealth Gini
Source: Authors’ estimations based on WAS Data (ONS, 2019).
This paper studies whether and how the unconventional monetary policy (UMP) opera-
tions implemented by the BoE affected financial and housing wealth inequalities in Great
Britain for the period 2006-2016. It contributes to the empirical literature investigating the
distributional effects of monetary policy on wealth inequality as follows:
First, this is the first study investigating the distributional effects of monetary policy on
wealth inequality for the UK by using low-level household balance sheet data at a relatively
high frequency. Investigating wealth inequalities in relation to monetary policy has received
much less attention than income inequalities in the literature (with some notable exceptions
including Adam and Tzamourani (2016); Coibion et al. (2017); Casiraghi et al. (2018); Lenza
and Slacalek (2018); Hohberger et al. (2019). This gap arises not due to lack of research in-
terest or policy relevance, but mainly due to serious data limitations. Reliable data reflecting
the household portfolio distribution across the entire population distribution are themselves
1See for example, Mumtaz and Theophilopoulou (2017); Guerello (2018) and Colciago et al. (2019) for a literature
review on the subject.
2Notable exceptions include Saiki and Frost (2014); Coibion et al. (2017); Auclert (2019)
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scarce; to say nothing about the availability of data reflecting their short-term dynamics,
which are extremely valuable to investigate portfolio responses to monetary policy develop-
ments. Against this background, we draw on the Wealth and Asset Survey, a large sample
survey on household finances in which individual responses are balanced proportionately over
time and geography to construct monthly indices of net wealth inequalities for the period
2006 - 2016. In this way, our paper contributes to the broader wealth inequalities litera-
ture by providing a range of unique time-series of financial and housing wealth inequality
estimates for the period preceding and following the Global Financial Crisis. Our ten-year
estimated monthly series can be used by researchers aiming to assess the impact of other
policies on the evolution of wealth inequalities.
Second, most of the existing empirical literature uses micro-simulation exercises (Doepke
and Schneider, 2006; Adam and Tzamourani, 2016; Bunn et al., 2018; Lenza and Slacalek,
2018) that typically provide information on household wealth or income distribution under
policy scenarios which deterministically affect one or more of the distribution’s components.
These techniques fail to capture the underlying economic mechanisms being at play, especially
when the policy effects are indirect or take time to realize. Even when micro-simulations
allow for a stochastic component, they usually have only a few data points that prevent a
long-run dynamic exploration of the relationship (Colciago et al., 2019). To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first paper that applies structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models
to investigate the impact of UMP shocks on wealth inequality. The available evidence on the
use of multivariate time series models to examine the effect of monetary policy on inequality
is limited with the exception of the studies of Saiki and Frost (2014), Guerello (2018), and
Inui et al. (2017) who yet focus on the impact of monetary policy on income inequality
or apply local projections. Instead, we adopt Bayesian methods to estimate our models.
Recently, Bayesian VAR methodology has become a relevant tool for evaluation of the effects
of conventional monetary policy shocks (see, for instance, Babura et al. (2010); Gal´ı and
Gambetti (2015); Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2019)). The Bayesian approach offers a solution
to the curse of dimensionality problem by shrinking the parameters via the imposition of
priors and, as discussed in Koop and Korobilis (2010), this approach offers a convenient
method to estimate precise error bands for impulse responses.
Third, our paper builds on the literature of monetary policy channels redistribution and the
different impacts of conventional and unconventional monetary policy. In contrast to most
empirical literature on wealth inequality which focuses on the financial asset inflation channel
(see, for example, Inui et al. (2017); O’Farrell and Rawdanowicz (2017); Hohberger et al.
(2019)), we specify the broader portfolio rebalancing mechanism being at play under periods
of UMP. In line with the relevant literature (Joyce et al., 2012), our model controls both for
the effect of increases in financial asset prices, but also for decreases in corporate bond yields,
and the secondary effect of increases in housing asset prices. Furthermore, we investigate
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the savings redistribution channel from savers to borrowers, that functions on the opposite
direction to the portfolio composition channel through drops in market net borrowing rates.
Thus, our approach exploring the effects of the different channels simultaneously, also adds
to the literature as most empirical studies analyze each distributional channel in isolation
(Colciago et al., 2019).
Fourth, to explore further the effects of UMP shocks on wealth inequality, we carry out
counterfactual policy analysis that allows us to explicitly measure what would have happened
to inequality had the BoE reversed its QE policy earlier. Therefore, our paper contributes
to the related literature (see, Bivens (2015)) by providing three counterfactual policy exper-
iments from two different VAR models, two conditional forecasts that are built on the main
BVAR model used to analyze impulse responses, and a structural approach based on a time
varying VAR model. Furthermore, we compare the effects of conventional versus unconven-
tional monetary policy on wealth inequality. To assess this, we use a Bayesian threshold
VAR that allows us to endogenously identify two different monetary policy regimes, i.e. zero
lower bound (ZLB) and non-ZLB states and estimate the asymmetric impact of monetary
policy shocks on wealth inequalities across the two regimes.
Two sets of results emerge from our analysis that shed light on theories linking monetary
policy and wealth inequality. First, impulse responses analysis suggests that unconventional
monetary policy shocks elicit significant long-lasting effects on wealth inequality: an ex-
pansionary monetary policy in the form of asset purchases raises wealth inequality across
households as measured by their Gini coefficients of total, housing, and financial net wealth
as well as across wealth quantiles. In numbers, the shock is estimated to increase the Gini
coefficient of total wealth by almost 0.03% or 0.06 original units one year after the change
in policy. In addition, forecast error variance decomposition shows that the contribution
of UMP shocks to fluctuations in the wealth Gini is around 11% at the first year horizon,
suggesting that UMP measures did play an important role in the widening of the wealth
gap over the forecasting period. The main results remain invariant to alternative specifica-
tions of the BVAR. We test their sensitivity to alternative specifications of the benchmark
BVAR including different measures of monetary policy in the ZLB and measures of wealth
inequality, different identification methods, and a medium-scale BVAR model that expands
the information set in the benchmark case. Our results remain robust to all specifications.
Second, we find that the portfolio rebalancing channel, via the effect of elevated financial
asset prices and lower corporate bond yields, plays an important role on the widening wealth
gap. A further counter-intuitive finding is that the redistributive effect of UMP from poorer
to richer households is less prominent but still present through the house prices channel.
This result echoes the home-ownership structure prevailing in Great Britain, and contradicts
most empirical studies, which predict house price increases to offset the regressive outcomes
of financial asset inflation. On the contrary, UMP shocks lead to a fall in wealth inequality
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via the savings redistribution channel, indicating that falls in the net borrowing rate do
redistribute wealth from savers to borrowers. Yet, the savings redistribution channel is
not strong enough to offset the upward pressures on inequality elicited by the other two
channels. Last, counterfactual policy experiments corroborate the results of the impulse
response analysis suggesting that QE did aggravate wealth inequality.
From a policy-making perspective, our results suggest that although UMP measures have
proven to be a powerful monetary instrument to boost liquidity and investment when the
ZLB is binding, they need to be qualified by acknowledging their undesirable side effects,
namely widening wealth disparities. Thus, our evidence informs policymakers in designing
monetary policy by taking into account its impact on wealth inequalities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical
background and the underlying theoretical intuitions on how monetary policy affects wealth
inequality. The section identifies the key transmission channels behind the relationship,
linking them to our empirical strategy. Section 3 presents the various data-sets used in this
study including the Wealth and Asset Survey, the short-term shadow rates (SSRs), used to
identify monetary policy changes under the ZLB. Additionally, it provides information on
wealth inequality summary statistics for the period in question (2006-2016) and presents the
construction of the inequality series. Section 4 discusses empirical strategy and identifying
assumptions behind the main Bayesian Var model employed and its variants. Section 5
presents the main results and explores alternate mechanisms that may be driving the rela-
tionship between monetary policy and wealth inequality. In addition, it provides a number
of robustness checks for the main model results using different identification strategies for
each of the two key variables. Section 6 concludes.
2. Distributional impacts of monetary policy and household heterogeneity:
theoretical intuitions of the channels
2.1. Empirical Background
Most empirical studies in the relevant literature focus on the interaction between conven-
tional monetary policy and income inequality. Recently, an increasing amount of studies
have begun investigating the influence of unconventional monetary policies on economic dis-
parities. The first study that explored this relationship was performed by Saiki and Frost
(2014) comparing conventional monetary policy measures with the QE implementation with
respect to their impact on income inequality in Japan. By applying a vector auto regression
(VAR) on survey data, they show that monetary policy worsened income inequality, once
the Bank of Japan (BoJ) initiated open market operations. For the case of the US, Bivens
(2015) compares UMP to a fiscal policy counterfactual scenario, and suggests that expan-
sionary monetary policy reduces inequality by stimulating income, increasing employment,
and wages, which primarily benefit the poorer segments of the distribution. Similarly, Mum-
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taz and Theophilopoulou (2017), analysing quarterly UK data for the period from 1969 to
2012, find that contractionary monetary policy explains around 10-20% of the variation in
income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient of income, consumption, and wages.
Guerello (2018) disentangles the effects of conventional monetary policy (CMP) and UMP
measures on the income distribution. Her measure of income inequality is constructed from
the monthly Consumer Survey of the European Commission, which provides qualitative an-
swers on a five-option ordinal scale. Her evidence from a VAR model suggest that CMP
measures have negligible regressive effect on the income distribution.
Much fewer studies looked at the relationship between monetary policy and wealth in-
equalities, particularly due to data limitations. Most of these studies focus on the portfolio
composition channel and mainly do so using micro-simulation exercises and local projections
to produce impulse responses. For instance, Adam and Tzamourani (2016) using the HFCS
dataset, find that during the post-crisis period, Eurozone countries experienced an overall
decrease in net wealth inequality, with increases in house prices counteracting the increase in
wealth inequality caused by increases in equity prices. Their results vary depending on the
relative distribution of housing and financial assets across countries. By contrast, Domanski
et al. (2016) examine six advanced economies and find that net wealth inequality has risen
since the financial crisis, with increases in equity prices outweighing house price increases.
Casiraghi et al. (2018) using quarterly data for Italian households simulate monetary pol-
icy impulses of household income and wealth statuses. Their evidence suggests a U-shaped
response of net wealth on monetary policy, with poorer indebted households and asset-rich
households mainly becoming better off, while those in the middle becoming worse off. Bunn
et al. (2018) using a similar framework for a single wave of the WAS dataset for Great
Britain, suggest that the overall effect of monetary policy on standard relative measures of
income and wealth inequality has been small. In a similar fashion, Lenza and Slacalek (2018)
using the HFCS dataset, simulate short-run effects of UMP by the ECB on wealth and in-
come inequalities for four euro-area countries, accounting for both employment and portfolio
composition channels. An exception from microsimulation approaches is Albert et al. (2018)
who estimate a SVAR for income and wealth inequality for US and Eurozone. However, the
use of the monetary base in this study as a proxy of QE is a poor identification strategy, as
UMP implies additional pass-through channels, often not reflected in the monetary base (see
Joyce et al. (2012) for a relevant discussion). As pointed by Colciago et al. (2019), most of
these approaches are not well equipped for capturing the multiple distributional dimensions
of monetary policy as reflected in theoretical models.
2.2. Wealth Inequality and Monetary Policy: Theoretical underpinnings
The transmission of UMP relies more on wealth effects than that of CMP. Table 1 summa-
rizes the effects and the mechanisms of the main channels identified in the literature. The
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portfolio rebalancing channel is a crucial transmitter of UMP to the financial system and the
economy. Under imperfect substitutability3 of assets, the announcement4. of asset purchases
by the central bank, can affect the composition of portfolios by influencing their relative sup-
plies. If the assets purchased are not perfect substitutes for money, then the sellers of these
assets rebalance their portfolios by buying other assets which are better substitutes. Hence,
the price of the substitutes will increase to the point where the market for assets and money
reaches an equilibrium. Increased asset prices imply lower yields, lower borrowing costs, and
higher spending through wealth effects on consumption (Tobin, 1961; Brunner and Meltzer,
1973; Joyce et al., 2012). As far as wealth inequality is concerned, the increases in asset
prices will result in capital gains, that benefit particularly wealthier households who are the
ones holding the bulk these assets across the wealth distribution (Coibion et al., 2017; Inui
et al., 2017; Hohberger et al., 2019).5
Other transmission channels rely on savings redistribution mechanisms and include the
effect of the borrowing/deposit rates and the unexpected inflation channel. Under expan-
sionary monetary policy, either CMP or UMP, indebted households standing on the bottom
of the wealth distribution, gain by experiencing a reduction in their interest payments on
debt, while savers, standing on the top of wealth distribution, lose by experiencing lower
returns (Bunn et al., 2018; Colciago et al., 2019). In a similar manner, unexpected inflation
favors debtors in the lower-middle of the wealth distribution who experience falls in the nom-
inal value of their liabilities, but adversely affects richer households who invest in long-term
bonds and are net lenders (Doepke and Schneider, 2006; Meh et al., 2010).
It is worth mentioning that household heterogeneity is key in the transmission of redistri-
butional wealth effects through both the portfolio rebalancing and the savings redistribution
channels. This is because both asset inflationary and net interest effects caused by mone-
tary policy shocks will ultimately depend on the household portfolio composition and the
loan/deposits contract structure of a country’s population.
Our empirical strategy is closely associated with the model of Hohberger et al. (2019)
who study the distributional effects of both CMP and UMP by comparing the impulse
responses of net financial wealth shares to expansionary monetary policy shocks, among
other inequality indicators. The authors estimate an open economy two-agent DSGE model
that distinguishes between two types of households: On the one hand, ”financial investors”
or non-liquidity constrained households, that hold financial assets (government bonds, firm
3 Imperfect substitutability may arise due to any asset feature, including convention and regulation. For instance,
banks may be required to hold a certain amount of government bonds because they are risk free.
4Interestingly, UMP shocks can influence domestic equity returns and volatility, depending on the Banks information
dissemination strategies (Chortareas et al., 2019)
5An interesting extension of portfolio composition channels to periods of CMP has been proposed by Bagchi et al.
(2019) who theorize about the presence of Cantillon effects in the relationship (Cantillon, 1755). When central banks
increase money supply, the pool of banks’ reserves widens, and new money is available for lending. Although the first
to be granted those loans are not necessarily wealthier, they are able to bid up the price of capital goods. In effect,
wealth inequality raises as banks channel new funds into the investments of the wealthier who have better access to
finance and thus increase their purchasing power. By contrast, the poor with lower access to finance receive new funds
only after its purchasing power has been eroded by inflation.
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Table 1—Monetary policy and wealth inequality : Transmission Channels
Channel & Monetary Policy Effect Mechanism
Portfolio rebalancing/ Financial asset prices rise Compositional /
Portfolio composition Short term bond yields fall Heterogeneity
(UMP) Housing asset prices rise
Savings Interest payments Compositional/
redistribution and deposit rates Heterogeneity
(CMP/UMP) on trackers fall
Falls (rises) in the Inflationary
Unexpected inflation (CMP*) nominal value Expectations
of debts (deposits)
*: Although there is no theoretical reason to assume that the unexpected inflation channel cannot function under
periods of UMP, we did not highlight this possibility due to the lack of relevant studies in the literature and no big
inflationary impact of the QE measures as of yet.
equity, and foreign bonds) receiving capital income, wages, and transfers, and, on the other
hand, ”asset-poor” or liquidity constrained households receiving only wages and transfers.
UMP is modeled as an expansion of the central bank balance sheet by purchasing long-term
bonds from households. In line with the portfolio rebalancing mechanism described above,
prices of imperfectly substitutable short-term financial assets increase, leading to a drop in
household savings, a reduction in firm financing costs, and exchange rate depreciation. In
turn, increases in value of the asset-rich net wealth imply increases in wealth inequality, as
liquidity constrained households have zero financial wealth by construction.
The results from their estimated DSGE model suggest that monetary policy, under both
CMP and UMP scenarios, increases net financial wealth inequality but its effects are short-
lived. Immediately after the shock, lower interest rates lead to increases in the value of
assets held by asset-rich households. In the medium term, however, UMP reduces the net
financial wealth share of NLC households, a result driven by the shrinking of the household’s
holding of interest-bearing long-term bonds and the reduction in private sector savings for
an extended period.
Our empirical model deviates from the above described behaviour as follows: In our em-
pirical estimations households hold housing in addition to financial assets. By overlaying
the net financial and net housing wealth distribution, one could distinguish between at least
three types of households. Asset-poor liquidity constrained households holding neither hous-
ing or financial wealth, home-owners with limited financial wealth, and asset-rich households
with large stocks of both financial and housing wealth.
As shown in figure 2 net housing wealth is more equally distributed than net financial
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wealth with a greater concentration of direct financial assets among households at the top
of the wealth distribution. Within financial wealth components, deposits and cash are more
equally distributed while riskier investment assets such as stocks and bonds are dispropor-
tionately held by wealthier households. Two intuitions come from this chart: First, the
disproportionate large holdings of financial by the top 20% - 25% of British households sug-
gests that the portfolio composition channel of monetary policy may be at play and have an
impact on inequality in a similar manner to the theoretical model described above. In our
model we test this effect empirically by controlling for both rebalancing effects, namely asset
price inflation and bond yields falls.
Second, the much more proportionate, but still uneven, distribution of housing wealth may
also imply effects of UMP on overall wealth inequality through the housing wealth channel,
if present. Indeed, the effect of UMP on net housing inequality is less straightforward. This
is because UMP affect the housing market in two ways: on the one hand, the purchase
of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) by the central bank leads to large scale mortgage refi-
nancing (Krishnamurthy et al., 2011) which increases net wealth (mortgage debt) of liquidity
constrained asset-poor households.6 On the other hand, UMP yields positive and persistent
effects on house prices and residential investment (Rahal, 2016), assets which are mainly held
by the middle and the upper parts of the total wealth distribution. Henceforth, depending
on the distribution of home-ownership, the value of housing assets, and the distribution of
debts across households, wealth inequality may decelerate, stay intact or accelerate. The
opposing evidence coming from various theoretical models assumptions suggests that the
effects of monetary policy on wealth inequality is a priory ambiguous. The effects of mon-
etary policy-induced asset-price changes on net wealth inequality depend on the relative
distributions of the assets and debts, which shape the different leverage and asset structures
across the wealth distribution (O’Farrell and Rawdanowicz, 2017). As the rise in asset prices
can either increase or reduce net wealth inequality and the evaluation of the effects deserve
an empirical investigation. In the following sections, we describe our empirical strategy for
assessing the impact on UMP for the case of Great Britain.
Last, our empirical strategy introduces the savings redistribution channel, by taking into
account the effects of borrowing rate falls on the distribution between net savers and debtors.
We expect the falls in interest rates to function at the opposite direction than the portfolio
composition channel.
6The purchase of MBS, however, is more relevant in the case of the US than the UK, where the FED bought this
type of assets aiming to support a housing market where excessive sub-prime loan backed securities was one of the
factors behind the crash.
10 DECEMBER 2019
Figure 2. Total net wealth and each component across the wealth distribution
Note: Authors’ estimations from Wealth and Asset Survey (2006 - 2016)
3. Constructing monthly estimates of wealth inequality in the UK
3.1. Data
Most existing time-series analysis estimating the impact of monetary policy shocks on
wealth inequality indices are based on aggregate macroeconomic indicators regressed against
partly disaggregate inequality measures (e.g., Gini coefficients of income, wages, consump-
tion, and rarely wealth). A caveat of those studies is the lack of reliable data, since surveys
on household balance sheets are usually provided at a low frequency, typically every one
or two years (Alvaredo et al., 2016; Bunn et al., 2018). The focus of our analysis is on
whether UMP shocks impact on the distribution of households’ wealth components, real and
financial assets and debts. Annual or bi-annual data on wealth would not allow us to assess
short-term policy impacts. Instead, we require low level household balance sheet data held
by households on a relatively high frequency, as well as information on the distribution of
these items across wealth percentiles. To achieve our goal, we estimate changes in wealth
inequality using information from the Wealth and Asset Survey (WAS) for the period 2006
- 2016 (ONS, 2019). WAS is a longitudinal household survey, in which households in Great
Britain7 are interviewed every two years. Approximately 30,000 households were interviewed
in wave 1, 20,000 in wave 2, 21,000 in wave 3, 20,000 in Wave 4, and 18,000 in Wave 5.8
7Excluding addresses north of the Caledonian Canal, the Scottish Islands and the Isles of Scilly.
8For cost-efficiency reasons, only 57% of the full sample of 30,595 responded to all components of their wealth in
the first wave. Consequently, this sub-sample will be included in this analysis with regards to the first wave.
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An important feature of WAS is that interviews were allocated over the 24-month field-
work period using systematic sampling with a random start point such that interviewees’
addresses were balanced proportionately over time and across space. The proportional al-
location across months and regions for all survey waves, allows us to break down the full
sample population into monthly representative sample cohorts from the date the fieldwork
commenced (July 2006) till its last released wave (June 2016). In total, we have around
100,000 observations of household net wealth for the entire period. This is a substantially
large sample period for our purposes, as it covers the entire UMP implementation sample
as well as a pre-crisis sample, when the BoE implemented traditional CMP. Each monthly
cohort comprises a minimum of 800 households, a number large enough to provide unbiased
inequality estimations using the Gini coefficient.9 Furthermore, our constructed monthly co-
horts also satisfy the theoretical requirements of a synthetic panel cohort, and, as such, can
be seen as a monthly representative sample of the UK population (Verbeek, 2008). Taking
advantage of the structure of WAS and the fact that interviews took place proportionately
throughout the year, we follow Cloyne and Surico (2016), Mumtaz and Theophilopoulou
(2017), and Inui et al. (2017) and assign households to different months each year based on
the date of survey interview. This feature allows us to calculate the measures of inequality
at a monthly frequency.
A constraint on providing reliable estimates of wealth inequality is the high non-response
rates of the wealthiest segments of the distribution. For instance, Vermeulen (2018) compared
the WAS estimates with those of the Forbes’ Billionaires list assuming a Pareto distribution.
His results suggest that WAS underestimates the top 1 per cent share of wealth by 1 to 5%.
The lack of reliable data representing the richest wealth shares partly explains the gap in the
literature for UK estimates of wealth inequality despite increasing interest on the subject in
the last ten years (Alvaredo et al., 2016, 2018). Ideally, the distribution of wealth would be
estimated in relation to the external control totals for population, based on administrative
personal wealth data (Alvaredo et al., 2016). Unfortunately, in the UK there is no annual
wealth tax so we could not apply such a control on our survey estimates.10 This is a limita-
tion of our dataset and, therefore, we recommend a degree of caution in the interpretation
of our results, due to possible under-representation of extremely rich households, and thus
underestimation of the overall level of wealth inequality. Yet, another feature of the WAS is
that it over-samples the wealthy addresses and therefore has an improved representation of
the right-skewed upper tail despite high non-response rates of the extremely rich.11 Further-
more, the central scope of this paper is to capture short-term effects of UMP on housing and
9According to Deltas (2003) the Gini can be biased downward in small samples, because for a given level of intrinsic
inequality, a reduction in the sample size leads to reductions in apparent inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient.
10Recent work by Alvaredo et al. (2018) addressed this caveat by imputing long-run estimates of wealth inequality
since 1895 using the distribution of estates at death. However, their yearly estimates cannot be used for short-term
analysis or for decomposing between real and financial wealth.
11In particular, the survey is constructed such that it over-samples wealthy addresses using a rate of 3 for the
wealthiest addresses (ONS, Wealth and Asset Survey Report).
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financial wealth inequality changes, rather than measuring wealth inequality for the entire
population per se.
The investigation of UMP effects on wealth inequality carries an additional identification
problem (Colciago et al., 2019). As the period of UMP overlap with the period of the ZLB, it
is tricky to disentangle the impact of low interest rates, UMP, or the interaction of both. To
identify UMP changes we use the short-term shadow rate (SSR) as a measure of the monetary
policy stance extracted by modelling the term structure of the yield curve. To the best of our
knowledge, only Inui et al. (2017) follow a similar identification approach to UMP shocks on
inequality for the case of Japan. The level and slope of the yield curve provides information
on investors’ perceptions and expectations with regards to future monetary policy actions
and about the course of the interest rates. Certainly, the strongest advantage of SSRs is
that they are a powerful instrument to predict the monetary policy stance at the zero lower
bound (ZLB) with the data from the non-ZLB period in a fixed-parameter model (Bullard
et al., 2012; Wu and Xia, 2016; Lombardi et al., 2018). An additional advantage of SSRs
over other proxies of UMP measures, is that SSRs use information from the entire yield
curve, including forward guidance, quantitative programmes, and their announcements.12
Consequently, SSRs can capture the overall effects of a given measure.13 For instance,
Christensen and Rudebusch (2016) compare the performance of the SSR model to a Gaussian
Dynamic structure model on predicting bond yields at the ZLB, and show that the use of
SSRs indicates higher in-sample fit, matches the compression in yield volatility, and delivers
improved real-time short-rate forecasts than the standard model. In the present analysis we
employ the two main SSR rates for the UK mostly cited in the literature, estimated by Wu
and Xia (2016) and by Krippner (2014); Claus et al. (2018). The two series are presented in
Figure A1 in Appendix A.14
3.2. Wealth Inequality Estimates for the period 2006-2016
The nature of wealth inequality often depends on the definition being adopted. Following
the relevant literature, we consider current net wealth as the standard wealth concept in
this analysis (Cowell and Van Kerm, 2015). Put simply, current net wealth stands for the
difference between assets and debts, depending on the type of wealth measured. It is defined
12Because financial markets are forward looking, the impact of asset purchases on bond yields is likely to occur when
expectations of purchases are formed and not necessarily when the purchases are realized. For instance, Joyce and Tong
(2012) show that the biggest impact of QE1 on bond yields took place when the purchases were initially announced.
13Another common proxy of UMP is estimations from central bank balance sheets, for instance, total Bank’s assets.
Balance sheet proxies reflect central bank’s purchases at the time they were implemented, if implemented, rather than
announcement impacts. An interesting example of the difference, was the ECB Open Market Operations (OMT)
programme which implied large quantitative effects when announced, but it was never actually implemented. As a
result, a significant UMP event would not be captured by a central bank balance sheet proxy. As BoE implemented all
of their announcements, there should be no issue with using either proxy in our case. Henceforth, we run a robustness
check using Bank’s balance sheets in section 5.5.2 as well.
14The SSR series have been obtained from Cynthia Wu’s website and can be ac-
cessed here: https://sites.google.com/view/jingcynthiawu/shadow-rates and Leo Krippner’s
website and can be accessed here: https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/research-and-publications/
research-programme/additional-research/measures-of-the-stance-of-united-states-monetary-policy/
comparison-of-international-monetary-policy-measures
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as follows:
x =
m∑
j=1
pijAj −D (1)
Where A >= 0 is the amount held of asset type j, pi is its price and D represents the call
on those assets represented by debt.
Financial assets (Financial wealth hereafter), include formal investments such as bank or
building society current or saving accounts, investment vehicles such as Individual Savings
Accounts (ISAs), endowments, stocks and shares, less any financial liabilities such as out-
standing balances on credit cards, arrears on household bills, and loans from formal sources.15
Non-financial assets (housing wealth hereafter) include self valuation of property owned, both
main residence plus any other land or property owned in the UK or abroad; less the out-
standing value of any loans or mortgages secured on these properties.16. We further exclude
consumer durables such as automobiles and housing equipment. As suggested by Wolff and
Zacharias (2009), although tangible assets carry a resale value, they can only accrue it by
compromising current consumption. Other studies measuring wealth inequality from survey
data use similar conventions (see, for example, Cowell et al. (2018)) In line with previous
studies on wealth distributions, the economic unit in this analysis is the household, where
assets and debts are summed up for all household members. As there is currently no con-
sensus in the literature on the need to equivalize wealth estimates, we do not adjust our
wealth estimates for household composition.17 All households with missing values for assets
or debts are dropped from the sample (less than 0.1% of the total sample). Based on the
above definition, we also produce the two main components of net wealth, namely housing
and financial net wealth. Net housing wealth includes all housing assets held by the house-
hold minus mortgage debts. Net financial wealth includes all formal financial assets minus
any type of formal debt secured on property. Lastly, we report a measure of augmented net
wealth which includes all possible assets reported in the survey and official household wealth
statistics, including informal assets and debts, all sorts of consumer durables and vehicles,
collectables and valuables, as well as accumulated pension wealth.
Our main measure of wealth inequality is the Gini coefficient of household’s net wealth
(Gj,t), defined as follows:
15We exclude informal financial assets, e.g., money under the bed or loaned to family or friends), childrens assets
and pension wealth, i) to reduce measurement error as formal financial assets and housing can be valuated by survey
respondents with greater precision, and ii) because possible influence of monetary developments on informal assets and
accumulated pension wealth is hard to capture in a structural model.
16Self valuation tends to yield higher estimates of worth than most other property indicators may suggest however,
when assessing individuals opinions, it is this perceived worth that will drive the individuals concerned.
17As Cowell and Van Kerm (2015) point out, if one interprets wealth as potential future consumption, it is not
current household structure that should matter, but future structure instead, perhaps after retirement when bequest
motives are realized. As a result, it would only make sense to adjust wealth using a future family structure equalizer,
which is of course not observable at present.
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Gj,t =
nt∑
i=1
(2i− nt − 1)x′i,t
n2tµt
(2)
where j is the type of assets that comprise each measure of net wealth (total net wealth,
financial, housing), t stands for the monthly sample that the interviewed household lies in,
i is the households rank order number, n is the number of all households present in each
month, xi is the household’s i net wealth value, and µ is the population average. The
Gini coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 representing perfect equality and 1 representing
perfect inequality. On top of being one of the most frequently used indicators of inequality,
Gini measures of inequality are well defined for negative values and their properties are
preserved (Cowell and Van Kerm, 2015)18. Allowing for negativity of input values is crucial
for exploring net wealth, as a portion of observations in our sample is lower than zero because
debts may exceed assets at a given point in time. Gini coefficient estimates fed with negative
wealth values implies that the index is not anymore upper bounded at 1, but can take any
positive value. Regarding wealth estimates, there is no theoretical maximum for inequality
since asset-free households can borrow infinitely to finance regressive transfers to rich ones
(Cowell et al., 2017).
In the empirical model of this study, we consider three more common inequality indicators
in our analysis and our robustness checks. Namely, we estimate the wealth percentiles
(quantiles) showing how much share of the total net wealth is held by different shares of the
population, the ratio of the wealth holdings of the top 20% richer share of the population
over the holdings of the 20% poorer share of the population (20:20 dispersion ratio), and
the coefficient of variation defined as the standard deviation divided by the mean of a given
distribution.
Table 2 shows mean values for different assets and liabilities over the 10 year period exam-
ined in nominal Great British Pounds (GBP). Net wealth increased by 35% over the entire
period, while gross total wealth increased by 34%. The mean value of all gross housing assets
grew by 27%, which is less than the overall percentage increase in gross wealth. The biggest
gains stem from formal financial assets growth which accounts to 60%. Augmented net
wealth increased by more than 40%, also more than main net wealth, implying a significant
increase in pension wealth during this period. The mean value of total liabilities increased
by 14%, much less than the increase in total assets. Housing related liabilities increased by
11% other financial liabilities increased by 42%.
We next turn to trends in wealth inequality using the aforementioned wealth concepts. Our
estimates for the Gini coefficients of total net wealth, augmented net wealth, net financial
wealth, and net housing wealth, are presented bi-annually in Table 3. On the basis of the
18Other Gini’s desirable properties as an inequality measure include scale independence, population independence,
symmetry, and the axiom of transfers
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WAS data, the Gini coefficient for net wealth increased substantially from 0.66 to 0.68, by
4.3%. The same index peaked at the years between 2012 to 2015 at 0.69. The net financial
wealth Gini stands around 0.9 for the entire period and is considerably larger than the
net housing wealth Gini with is approximately 0.66. Yet, the latter indicated much larger
increases of 4.34% for the period in question, compared to slight increases of 0.5% for the
former. Similar conclusions are drawn by observing the estimates for quantile shares of the
three wealth indices. The share of the richest 75% held around 71% in 2006/07 and almost
75% of total net wealth in 2016 indicating an increase of almost 5%. These increases are
mostly attributed to housing wealth gains which increased by 5.7% over the whole period, and
less so to financial wealth gains which increased only slightly. Interestingly, the corresponding
increases of the richest 10% of the population are sharper, implying a large redistribution
towards the upper segments of the net wealth distribution.
Figure 3 shows our estimations for the Gini coefficients of total net wealth, net financial
wealth, net housing wealth, and augmented net wealth, as they evolve from 2006 to 2016 on
a monthly basis, estimated according to the methodology described above. We also include
the timeline of the various UMP rounds as announced by the BoE during the period in
question. The first round of UMP (QE1) was announced on 5 March with an initial decision
to purchase 75 billion of assets over 3 months financed by issuance of central bank reserves.
The purchases increased to 200 billion over the next month and the scheme was completed in
January 2010. The second round of UMP (QE2) through asset purchases begun in October
2011, in response to the impact of Euro crisis. Additional 125 billion of purchases completed
in May 2012. Lastly, additional 50 billion announced in July 2012 and completed in November
2012. In August 2016, the BoE announced a third round of purchases (QE3) amounting to
GBP 60bn of UK government bonds and 10bn of corporate bonds, to address uncertainty
over Brexit and concerns about productivity and economic growth. Being equipped with
these series, in the next section we set-up our VAR model to assess the role of UMP on
wealth inequalities in Great Britain.
We observe a significant jump in the Gini of financial net wealth following the announce-
ment of QE1, while total net wealth and net housing wealth take accelerate after the an-
nouncement of QE2. Augmented net wealth presents a falling tendency up until the an-
nouncement of QE2 and then it raises.
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Figure 3. Net wealth Gini and its components from 2006 to 2016
Source: Authors’ estimations from Wealth and Asset Survey (2006 - 2016).
Note 1: Gini coefficients (six month-moving average). Net wealth refers to total household’s assets minus liabilities,
excluding pension wealth, tangible assets other than housing, and informal financial assets and debts. Augmented net
wealth includes these assets. Net housing wealth includes all housing assets held by the household minus mortgage
debts. Net financial wealth includes all formal financial assets minus any type of formal debt collateralized on property.
Note 2: The red dotted lines depict the announcements of UMP by the BoE.
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Table 2—Descriptive statistics of wealth variables (Mean values and percentiles)
2006-07 2008-09 2010-11 2012-13 2014-15 2016
Financial Assets (formal) 42297 44529 48657 59433 58198 68055
Financial Assets (all) 48360 47884 51553 61849 60343 70570
Housing Assets (HMR) 159878 154519 158940 161879 177993 204163
Housing Assets (all) 151421 138971 143503 147523 167079 199300
Financial Liabilities 3414 3826 4251 3987 4297 4849
Housing Liabilities 41540 40860 41364 40646 42334 46495
Total Liabilities 44953 44686 45615 44634 46630 51344
Total wealth (gross) 202175 199049 207597 221312 236186 272218
Net property wealth 151421 138971 143503 147523 167079 199300
Net financial wealth 44280 43661 46830 57315 55493 64945
Net wealth (augmented*) 386670 408941 389569 418850 465097 547112
Net wealth 195691 182537 190312 204810 222520 264216
Net wealth percentiles
10 -599 -1000 -850 -831 -850 -1400
25 3500 3152 3000 2300 2500 3380
50 113300 106367 104256.5 100338 106451 124780
75 248406 237014 242287 251000 276020 327740
90 450308 428750 444976 473000 526200 643000
Net housing wealth percentiles
10 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 97000 90000 90000 85000 90000 105000
75 200000 189999 195000 200000 220000 259999
90 341000 318998 340000 350000 400000 498500
Net financial wealth percentiles
10 -4434 -6015 -6551.3 -5748 -5928 -7391
25 1 0 0 4 5 6
50 5432 6154 5900 5550 5890 7390
75 38050 38500 38501 39500 41110 52000
90 113100 115890 115500 124089 133710.5 173400
Observations 14088 19181 21391 20427 19184 4464
Note: All nominal values are estimated in Great British Pounds. Population sampling weights have been applied.
Augmented net wealth includes pension wealth, as well as the self-reported value informal financial assets and liabilities
to our net wealth concept.
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4. Model set-up
We estimate the impact of UMP shocks on wealth inequality by applying the following
structural VAR model:
yt = c+
p∑
j=1
yt−jBj + νt (3)
where yt is the matrix of endogenous variables, Bj is the coefficient matrix, c is the vector
of constant terms, and νt ∼ N (0,Σ). The covariance matrix of the residuals, Σ can be
decomposed as A0A
′
0 = Σ, with A0 representing the contemporaneous impact of the struc-
tural shocks, t, where νt = A0t. The matrix yt contains industrial production (IP), the
consumer price index (CPI), the spread between the 10-year Government bond minus the
3-month rate, the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), and the wealth inequality mea-
sure. To determine the impact of UMP on wealth inequality we use the short-term shadow
rate as a measure for the stance of monetary policy.
We estimate our model by adopting a Bayesian approach. We use a natural conjugate
prior as described in Blake et al. (2012) and Koop and Korobilis (2010) while estimation is
performed by using a Gibbs sampling algorithm to approximate the posterior distribution
of the model parameters. As discussed in Koop and Korobilis (2010) and Koop (2017),
structural analysis is benefited from Bayesian VARs as without prior information, it is hard
to obtain precise estimates of so many coefficients and as a result, features such as impulse
responses and variance decompositions tend to be imprecisely estimated.
In order to describe the priors and the algorithm used to estimate the BVAR, consider the
compact form of equation 3:
Yt = XtB + νt where X = {ci, Yit−1, ..., Yit−p}, or
Yt = (IN⊗X) B+ V where y = vec (Yt), b = vec (B), and V = vec (νt).
The prior for the VAR coefficients b is normal and given by p (b) =∼ N (b¯0,Σ⊗ Ξ). For
b¯0, a conventional Minnesota scheme will be typically adopted, setting values around 1 for
own first lag coefficients, and 0 for cross variable and exogenous coefficients. When setting
Ξ we approach a Minnesota type of variance matrix by adopting the strategy followed in
Karlsson (2013) according to which Ξ is a diagonal matrix where the diagonal elements
are defined as σ2αij =
(
1
σ2j
)(
λ1
lλ3
)2
for lag terms, and σj are variances approximated by
individual AR regressions estimated via OLS. For exogenous variables, the variance is defined
as σ2e = (λ1λ4)
2. We set λ1 = 0.1, λ3 = 1, λ4 = 10
3 that is typical in the literature. The
posterior distribution of the VAR coefficients conditional on Σ is normal, given by:
H (b\Σ, Yt) ∼ N (µ∗, ν∗) (4)
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where:
µ∗ =
(
H−1 + Σ−1 ⊗X ′tXt
)−1 (
H−1b¯0 + Σ−1 ⊗X ′tXtbˆ
)
and
n∗ =
(
H−1 + Σ−1 ⊗X ′tXt
)−1
where bˆ denotes the OLS estimate of the VAR coefficients in vectorised format: bˆ =
vec
(
(X ′tXt)
−1 (X ′tYt)
)
.
Next, regarding Σ, the conjugate prior is an inverse Wishart distribution with prior scale
matrix S and prior degrees of freedom α, that is p (Ω) ∼ IW (S, α). Following Karlsson
(2013), we set S = (a− n− 1)σd where σd is a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements
given by σ2ι and α = n + 2. Given this prior, the posterior for Σ conditional on b is also
inverse Wishart:
H (Σ\b, Yt) ∼ IW (Σ,T + α) (5)
where T is the sample size and
Σ = S¯ + (Yt −XtB)′ (Yt −XtB)
The Gibbs sampling algorithm consists of the following two steps. First, we sample the
VAR coefficients from their conditional posterior distribution (Equation 4). Second, given
b from step 1, we draw Ω from its conditional distribution (Equation 5). The algorithm
is run for 100,000 iterations discarding the initial 60,000 to ensure convergence. Based on
information criteria, we estimate the BVAR with four lags, considering alternative lag lengths
in the robustness section.
Regarding the identification of the UMP shock, we follow the relative literature on the
monetary policy transmission popularized by Christiano et al. (1999, 2005) by adopting a
recursive ordering of the variables based on the Cholesky decomposition of the Σ matrix:
Σ = A0A
′
0 as defined previously ordering of the variables, the monetary policy rate is ordered
after economic activity, inflation and the inequality index and before the yield spread and
NEER. These restrictions on the macroeconomic variables are fairly standard in the literature
and imply that output and prices react to monetary policy changes with a lag while a
monetary policy shock is allowed to affect financial variables contemporaneously. Note that
the results from the main specification are robust to different identification schemes that we
describe later in the paper.
5. Results
5.1. The response of wealth inequality to UMP shocks
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses over 30 months of all variables to a 20 basis point
cut in the shadow rate. We note that the shock leads to a significant increase of the net
wealth Gini coefficient. The impact of UMP shocks on raising wealth inequality is long-lived
MONETARY POLICY AND WEALTH INEQUALITIES IN THE GREAT BRITAIN 21
given that the effect persists for the whole forecasting horizon. Regarding the magnitude of
the effect, we observe that the UMP shock is estimated to increase the Gini coefficient by
almost 0.03% or 0.06 original units one year after the change in policy.
Figure 4. The impulse response of the Gini coefficient to a monetary policy shock.
Note: The vertical axis of each plot shows the responses in percent (apart from the shadow rate that is in percentage
points). Time intervals on the x-axis are months. The green line is the median estimate and the pink shaded area
depicts the 68 percent error bands.
In terms of the responses of the core macroeconomic variables to UMP shocks, we note a
positive reaction of IP by around 0.07% four months after the shock and a gradual increase
in the CPI that reaches its peak (increase of 0.015%), one year after the shock. This result
highlights the short-term benefits of UMP, that is, to support economic growth and boost
inflation. Last, the 20 basis points reduction in the shadow rate elicits a fall in both the term
spread and the nominal effective exchange rate on impact, as it would be expected. Similar
responses have been obtained by Hohberger et al. (2019) after shocking an estimated DSGE
of the EU economy with an expansionary monetary policy shock of both CMP and UMP.
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5.2. Robustness checks of benchmark model
We test the robustness of the main findings by implementing an extensive sensitivity
analysis. First, as estimated SSR series vary depending on modeling assumptions (Krippner,
2019), we test the sensitivity of our estimates by employing an alternative SSR series as
defined in Krippner (2014) and Claus et al. (2018). Second, we re-estimate our model by
providing alternative estimation of UMP shocks based on BoE total assets. A number of
papers suggest that innovations on central bank assets do capture UMP innovations well
during the period of the GFC (Gambacorta et al., 2014; Saiki and Frost, 2014). Although
total assets capture only the quantitative effects of UMP, they remain observable variables
and as such they serve as a good robustness check for our purposes. To properly identify
the monetary policy shock, we adopt the identification scheme based on sign restrictions
and described in Baumeistera and Benati (2013) and Boeckx et al. (2017). Accordingly, we
assume that the contemporaneous impact, of a shock that increases the balance sheet, on
output and prices is positive while the same expansionary balance sheet shock decreases the
yield spread and leaves the monetary policy rate unchanged. Regarding the mechanics of
the process, we follow Rubio-Ramirez et al. (2008) by letting Σt = PDP
′ be the eigenvalue-
eigenvector decomposition of Σt and set Σ¯0 = PD
1/2. We then draw an rxr matrix K
from N(0, 1) and we compute Q such that K = QR. Having these in hand, we compute
the structural impact matrix as Σ0 = Σ¯0Q
′ and retain it, if it satisfies the sign restrictions.
Note that we also address the problem described in Fry and Pagan (2011) under which the
sign restrictions methodology presents impulse responses from different models rather than
a single model and this could be misleading as a description of a single economy. To avoid
this, we include a median target approach that selects the A0 matrix that is closest to the
median from a given number of draws from the algorithm.
Next, we replicate the benchmark analysis by using two alternative identification schemes.
Specifically, we estimate a version of the model by adopting a stronger restriction that forces
all the variables in the system to respond to UMP shocks with a lag, i.e. a cut in the shadow
rate has a zero impact on all variables contemporaneously; we achieve this by ordering
the shadow rate last and after the financial variables. Secondly, we use sign restrictions
instead of recursive decomposition by assuming that an expansionary UMP shock leads to
a contemporaneous decrease in the shadow rate and the yield spread, a rise in inflation and
IP, and a decrease in the effective exchange rate (see also Uhlig (2005)).
Furthermore, we estimate two additional versions of the benchmark model, this time by
checking whether our results are sensitive to the use of alternative inequality measures.
We first re-estimate the benchmark model by replacing the Gini coefficient with the 20-20
ratio of net wealth. The 20:20 ratio compares the share of wealth of the 20% wealthiest
households with the share of wealth of the 20% poorest, effectively depicting the wealth of
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the rich as a multiple of the poors wealth. In other words, the the 20:20 ratio is equal to
(100−Q80)/Q20, where Q20 and Q80 are the quantiles of order 0.2 and 0.8, respectively. In
the second specification we use a popular alternative to the Gini, namely the coefficient of
variation. The coefficient of variation is estimated by dividing the standard deviation of the
net wealth distribution by its mean. The more equal a wealth distribution is, the smaller
the standard deviation and consequently the coefficient of variation will be smaller in more
equal distributions19.
Last, the findings are robust to perturbations to the benchmark VAR specification such as
the addition of extra lags and the inclusion of additional endogenous variables. Specifically,
in the former case, we re-estimate our model by including six lags. In the latter case, we
augment the vector of endogenous variables by including a large number of macroeconomic
and financial variables.20 Note that now the size of the BVAR increases significantly. This
inevitably leads to the curse of dimensionality that refers to the large number of parameters
that have to be estimated in the model. We deal with this issue by adopting a dummy
observation prior as described in Babura et al. (2010) and Blake et al. (2012) to achieve
Bayesian shrinkage. Practically, the hyperparameter that controls the overall tightness λ of
the prior distribution is set in relation to the size of the BVAR so that the higher the number
of variables is, the more the parameters should be shrunk to avoid overfitting.
The results from these eight different specifications described above are depicted in Figure
5. Note that we only show the response of the inequality measure as this is the variable of
main interest. We observe that the responses of the inequality measure in all cases convey a
similar message to the benchmark case, generating a significant increase of wealth inequality
that persists over the forecasting horizon. Regarding the other variables of the system, the
macroeconomic responses (not reported here but available upon request) are similar to the
benchmark case with the UMP shocks generating a positive reaction of IP and CPI and a
negative response of the term spread and the NEER on impact.
19According to Cowell et al. (2018) the coefficient of variation is the only inequality measure within the Generalized-
Entropy class that is applicable to wealth distributions. Yet, because by construction, the measure is very sensitive to
outliers in the two tails, it is more appropriate when the distribution approaches normality. To address this problem
for this robustness check, we top-coded the richest and the poorest 1% of our sample and then estimated the coefficient
of variation for household net-wealth. Although, this is admittedly a crude approach to correct for extreme values at
the two tails, potentially leading to underestimation of inequality, it is still widely used in the relevant literature (see,
Mumtaz and Theophilopoulou (2017); Coibion et al. (2017)) and can help reducing measurement bias of the coefficient
of variation estimates (Colciago et al., 2019)
20We augment the initial vector of endogenous variables by adding: the UK all share index, the crude oil price in
dollars, imports, exports, government consumption, unemployment rate, weekly earnings, the 3-month Treasury bill
rate, the 5-year Government bond yield and last, the 10-year and the 20-year Government bond yields
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Figure 5. Robustness checks of the baseline result
Note: The vertical axis of each plot shows the response in percent. Time intervals on the x-axis are months. The
green line is the median estimate and the pink shaded area depicts the 68 percent error bands.
5.3. Heterogeneity of responses-Percentile groups
In order to uncover potential reasons behind the response of wealth inequality on UMP
shocks witnessed above, we examine how households at different points on the distribution
respond to the same UMP shock defined above. The impulse responses of each share (i.e.,
0-25; 26-50; 51-75; 76-100) to UMP shocks are shown in Figure 6. Having in mind a model
set-up with multiple agents across the asset and debt distribution similar to the one described
in section 2, increases (declines) in the asset-rich portfolio values correspond to increasing
(declining) wealth inequality. UMP shocks boost the value of assets and in turn the net wealth
position of asset rich households. This is translated in our empirical model to increases in
the net wealth Gini (Figure 4), which, as can be seen by observing the bottom right panel
of Figure 6, is due to increases to the quantile share of the upper households in the net
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wealth distribution, i.e. those standing on the fourth quantile (76-100). As can be observed
in figures B1 and B2 in Appendix B, similar patterns emerge if we decompose the wealth
shares in their two main components, financial and housing net wealth. According to figure
B1, the asset price inflation effect for the richest quantile is positive and significant in the
first year after the shock. Following the theoretical channels described earlier, a possible
explanation for this result is that financial asset owners that have originally switched to
short-term instruments when re-balancing their portfolios, effectively lose coupon payments
from long-term bond holdings. It is also crucial to stress that although the effect on the top
quantile is falling, it never gets negative as in the poorer quantiles. This comes in contrast
to theoretically estimated studies and suggests that the revaluation effect is stronger than
the capital income losses effect (Hohberger et al., 2019).
Figure 6. Impulse responses of net wealth quantiles
Note: The vertical axis of each plot shows the response in percent. Time intervals on the x-axis are months. The pink
line is the median estimate and the green shaded area depicts the 68 percent error bands.
5.4. Unconventional monetary policy on Wealth inequalities: variance decomposition
Another way to highlight the role played by UMP shocks in driving fluctuations in the
Gini coefficient is by looking at the forecast error variance decomposition. Figure 7 plots the
contribution of the UMP shock to the forecast error variance of the inequality measure. The
red dotted line shows the median estimate and the light blue shade area is the 68% error
bands. We observe that the median contribution of the UMP shock to fluctuations in the
wealth Gini is around 11% at the first year horizon, suggesting that UMP measures did play
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an important role in the widening of the wealth gap over the 2009-2016 period.
Figure 7. Percentage contribution of unconventional monetary policy shocks to the forecast error
variance of the net wealth Gini coefficient.
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Note: Percentage contribution of UMP shocks to the forecast error variance of the Gini coefficient.The red dotted line
is the median estimate and the light blue shaded area depicts the 68% error band.
5.5. Unconventional monetary policy on Wealth inequalities: capturing the channels
Next, we augment our main BVAR specification by adding five variables in order to examine
the transmission channels through which UMP affects wealth inequality. First, as discussed
in Section 2, the impact of central bank asset purchases on equity prices and returns is
established in the UMP literature and functions through the portfolio-rebalancing channel
(Joyce et al., 2012; McLaren et al., 2014; Neely, 2015). The announcement of central bank
purchases implies a simultaneous increase in asset prices and a drop in corporate bond yields
(Joyce et al., 2012; Neely, 2015). On the one hand, government bond yields lead to lower
corporate bond yields for a given corporate bond spread to compensate for the risks of holding
corporate bonds relative to government bonds. On the other hand, government bond yields
increase the present value of future dividends, thus raising equity prices. Furthermore, as
investors rebalance their portfolios from risk-free government bonds to more risky assets,
reduces the risk-premium for holding equities, and therefore, puts upward pressure on their
prices Joyce et al. (2011, 2012). To capture the simultaneous impact of QE on corporate bond
yields and equity prices, we use the ”UK all share index” taken from the FRED database and
the Sterling (GBP) corporate bond yields on all issuers (including financials) rated AAA-BBB
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that, taken from the millennium of macroeconomic database of BoE, respectively.21 Both
variables allow us to quantify the impact of the portfolio rebalancing channel on wealth
inequality changes.
Second, we investigate the channel that works via effects of higher asset prices through
housing wealth. To do this, we augment our BVAR with the housing market index taken
from Gov.UK as an additional variable. As mentioned earlier, UMP can affect the housing
market by inflating house prices and boosting residential investment (Rahal, 2016). Given
the more even distribution of housing wealth compared to financial wealth, the expected
effect of UMP on housing wealth inequality can go either direction. Third, we look at the
savings redistribution channel as proxied by the effect of a decreased borrowing rate on the
net wealth position of borrowers and savers (Inui et al., 2017; Casiraghi et al., 2018). Our
hypothesis is that when the savings redistribution channel is open, the QE impacts on the
borrowing rate and borrowers are likely to be better off as interest payments on debts fall
more than interest payments on savers’ deposits. We use the mortgage interest rate and the
unsecured loan rate taken from the millenium macroeconomic database of BoE in order to
uncover the potential impact of this channel.
We build the counterfactuals as hypothetical impulse responses which depict only the direct
impact of UMP shocks on inequality and neutralize the indirect effect through each of the
three transmission channels. This is done by constructing a counterfactual sequence of shocks
to the variables such that the impulse response of each of the additional variables described
above, to UMP shocks, is equal to zero at all horizons. The comparison of the counterfactual
responses of Gini with the actual responses estimated in the unrestricted model give us a
statistical measure of the importance of each of these channels on the transmission of UMP
to households’ wealth.
Figure 8 show the results. The red solid lines represent the median responses of Gini
computed in the unrestricted BVAR together with the 68% confidence bands while the
dotted lines show the median response of Gini from the counterfactual experiment. We
observe that shutting down the share index and the corporate spread to UMP shocks lead
to significant declines of the responses of Gini (note that both counterfactual responses are
below the responses of the unrestricted model while they also lie outside the error bands
for most of the forecasting horizon), indicating that the portfolio rebalancing channel has an
important role in increasing wealth inequality. Our results confirm empirical works suggesting
a positive effect of the portfolio composition channel on wealth inequality Domanski et al.
(2016); Casiraghi et al. (2018); Adam and Zhu (2015); Lenza and Slacalek (2018) for other
countries, but contradict theoretical predictions implying that the effect is short-lived and
changes direction in the medium-run (Hohberger et al., 2019).
Next, we observe that when the housing prices channel is shut down, the counterfactual
21See, www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/quarterlybulletin/threecenturiesofdata.xls
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Figure 8. Unconventional monetary policy on wealth inequality: transmission channels
Note: The red line show the median estimate and the blue shaded area is the 68% error band. The dotted lines show
the median response of Gini from the counterfactual experiment.
response of Gini in the first twenty months after the shock is lower in magnitude compared
to its counterparts in the unrestricted case, thus exerting extra pressure on the widening of
the wealth gap. This finding comes in contrast to most of the simulations literature that
predict housing price increases offsetting the regressive outcomes of financial asset inflation
(Adam and Tzamourani, 2016; Lenza and Slacalek, 2018; Bivens, 2015; Bunn et al., 2018).
As this finding is partly driven by the share of households in Great Britain with no housing
assets at all (around 25% according to our estimates), it adds to the policy relevant literature
suggesting that the promotion of home-ownership for lower wealth groups should lead to lower
wealth inequality (see, Kaas et al. (2019)). The reverse effect is observed when we switch off
the savings redistribution channel (i.e. setting the coefficients of both the mortgage interest
rate and the unsecured loan rate, to zero). The counterfactual response of Gini is significantly
higher in the first year following the shock, indicating that the savings redistribution channel
acts as a counterbalancing force since the fall in wealth inequality offsets the upward pressures
on inequality elicited by the other two channels.
5.6. Counterfactual policy analysis
The analysis so far has focused on the role of UMP shocks in driving wealth inequality in
the zero lower bound period. In this section, we explicitly measure the impact of quantitative
easing (QE) on inequality by focusing on the period before the implementation of the last
round of quantitative easing in August 2016, where the BoE had already completed a total of
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GBP 435 billions of purchases. In particular, we are interested in exploring what would have
happened to the wealth inequality if the BoE had reversed its QE policy earlier. In order to
measure the impact of QE on the Gini coefficient, we use our benchmark BVAR model to
simulate the economy one period ahead conditional on specific counterfactual policy paths.
Specifically, the BVAR model is estimated from 2009:01 up to 2014:12 and then it is used
to carry out two counterfactual experiments from 2015:01 to 2016:06. Each counterfactual
experiment involves two conditional forecasts that we will call them the ’QE-scenario’ and
the ’non-QE scenario’.
In relation to the first counterfactual experiment, we replace the shadow rate with the
policy rate in the benchmark BVAR in 5.1, and, following Kapetanios et al. (2012) we
assume that QE affects the economy by reducing the yield on long-term government bonds.
Therefore, the first conditional forecast assumes that the path of the term spread is higher
than observed by 100 basis points over the forecasting horizon (non-QE scenario); this could
be considered as a quantitative tightening policy. The second conditional forecast assumes
that the term spread equal its observed value over the forecasting horizon (QE scenario).
With respect to the second counterfactual experiment, we now assume that QE affects
the economy by reducing the shadow rate. The first conditional forecast uses the shadow
rate as a measure of monetary policy over the forecasting horizon (QE scenario) while in the
second conditional forecast, we replace the values of the shadow rate with the actual policy
rate over the forecasting horizon (non-QE scenario); this latter can be seen as a quantitative
tightening policy.
Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the results. The blue line shows the actual data for the Gini
coefficient, the red line shows the median conditional forecast of the Gini coefficient under the
non-QE scenario while the green dotted line shows its median conditional forecast under the
QE scenario. We can see from both figures that the forecasts of the wealth Gini coefficients
are much higher in the QE scenario as opposed to the non-QE scenario, throughout the
forecasting period. The results suggest that UMP measures inflated the wealth of the rich
and therefore widened inequality.
We should highlight that this approach is based on out of sample forecasts from the
BVAR model, thus the forecast distributions linked with both scenarios are extremely wide
indicating that the estimates are uncertain. To check the robustness of our results, we adopt
a different, structural approach based on Baumeistera and Benati (2013). Specifically, we
employ a time varying VAR model (TV-VAR) by using the policy rate, the term spread, the
Gini coefficient, inflation and IP. We describe the model in detail in the Appendix A.A1.
The model is estimated from 2009:01 to 2016:06. The innovation here with respect to the
previous two approaches is that we use sign restrictions in order to be able to identify a
shock to the term spread. In particular, following the identification scheme proposed by
Baumeistera and Benati (2013), we assume that a contractionary monetary policy shock,
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Figure 9. The impact of QE on Gini coefficient when the term spread is the measure of monetary policy
Figure 10. The impact of QE on Gini coefficient when the shadow rate is the measure of monetary policy
Notes for Figures 8,9: The blue line shows the actual data for the Gini coefficient, the red line shows the median
forecast under the non-QE scenario while the green dotted line shows its median forecast under the QE scenario.
Figure 11. The impact of QE on Gini coefficient from a TV-VAR model
Note: The yellow starred line shows the counterfactual path while the blue line shows the actual data. The light blue
shaded area depicts the 68% bands.
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consistent with quantitative tightening, increases the term spread, contemporaneously leads
to a fall in inflation and IP but leaves the policy rate unchanged. At the same time, we
assume that a conventional monetary policy shock raises the policy rate and leads to a fall
in the term spread, inflation and IP contemporaneously. Having identified the term spread
shock, we conduct a counterfactual experiment from 2015:01 to 2016:06 where we scale the
shock such that the counterfactual value of the term spread is higher than the actual value
by 100 basis points; in essence, what we get is the counterfactual path in the absence of QE.
Figure 11 presents the results. Note that in order to examine whether QE could have
affected the wealth Gini coefficient, we need to compare the implied path of the Gini co-
efficient obtained by the counterfactual scenario as described above with the actual path.
The yellow starred line shows the counterfactual path while the blue line shows the actual
data. The light blue shaded area depicts the 68% bands linked to the simulation. Our re-
sults suggest that during the whole simulation period the counterfactual distribution of the
Gini coefficient is consistently below the actual data. This finding is in line with our results
obtained from the previous approach, corroborating our hypothesis that UMP aggravated
wealth inequality.
5.7. Conventional Monetary Policy versus Unconventional Monetary Policy on wealth inequality
As discussed in section 2, the portfolio composition channel is the most crucial one for the
transmission of unconventional monetary policy to the wealth holdings, and this takes place
under periods through portfolio rebalancing by investors, which, in turn, affects the price
of assets held by households. Still, the other main channel, namely savings redistribution
via the borrowing rate, does function also under periods of CMP. The evidence from the
literature is mixed when it comes to the distributional consequences of CMP, and most of
the studies suggest that if any relationship exists, it favours the poorer parts for the wealth
distribution (Meh et al., 2010; Doepke and Schneider, 2006; Adam and Zhu, 2015), with only
a few studies suggesting the opposite case (for example, Bagchi et al. (2019)).
To strengthen our case for the redistributional consequenses of UMP, we investigate whether
the effects of monetary policy shocks on wealth inequality differ depending on two monetary
policy states, i.e. the ZLB state where UMP measures are implemented and the non ZLB
state where CMP is implemented. To do this, we use a Bayesian threshold VAR (TVAR)
model that allows us to endogenously identify these two monetary policy states with respect
to one transition variable that, in our case, is the shadow rate. The two different mone-
tary policy states are determined by the value of this threshold variable with respect to a
certain threshold that is estimated within the model. We use the six variables as defined
in the benchmark specification while the monetary policy shock is identified using the same
recursive identification scheme discussed in Section 4. The model is run over the full sample
period, i.e. from 07/2006 to 06/2016. We describe the model in detail in the Appendix
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A.A2.
Figure 13 presents the impact of a 20 basis points decrease in the shadow rate on the
Gini coefficient, in both conventional and unconventional monetary policy regimes. Before
we discuss this figure, it is worth inspecting Figure 12. The graph reveals that our TVAR
successfully identifies the two monetary policy regimes that took place from the beginning of
our sample until 2016, in the UK. In particular, the estimated threshold and the threshold
variable show that regime one persisted up to early 2009 while from that point onward,
regime two prevailed. Therefore, we interpret the negative shadow rate shock in regime one
as representative of expansionary monetary policy via conventional measures, i.e. typical
interest rate cuts, while we interpret the same shock in regime two as indicative of UMP
shocks.
Figure 12. Estimated threshold against the threshold value
Figure 13. Impulse responses of CMP and UMP on the Gini coefficient of wealth inequality
(a) UMP (b) CMP
Note: The vertical axis of each plot shows the response of Gini coefficient in percent. Time intervals on the x-axis are
months. The yellow line is the median estimate and the pink shaded area depicts the 68 percent error bands.
Back to Figure 13, the right graph shows that in the conventional policy regime, an ex-
pansionary policy shock leads to a gradual rise in the Gini coefficient; note however that the
null hypothesis that this effect equals zero cannot be rejected. On the other hand, the left
graph shows that after a short-lived initial fall, we observe a continuous increase of the Gini
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coefficient that becomes positive and significant, reaching approximately 0.03% after two
years (note that the estimated figure is very close to the one obtained under our benchmark
model). Overall, the results indicate that conventional interest rate cuts up to early 2009
did not worsen wealth inequality while the alternative policy measures implemented since
that date, have contributed to the surge of wealth inequalities.
Our results are in line with the evidence coming the existing literature suggesting that
expansionary CMP does not increase wealth inequality. Yet, they should be read with caution
as our dataset covers only a fraction of the long period during which CMP was implemented
before the bank rate touched zero level. Thus, further work is needed that delves deeper
to analyzing the effect of CMP on wealth inequality from a historical perspective.22 Still,
the juxtaposition of the two different monetary policy states using the same model, clearly
strengthens the case put forward in this study in favour of a regressive redistributive effect
of UMP
6. Concluding Remarks
We illustrated that UMP shocks have significant effects on wealth inequality: an expan-
sionary monetary policy in the form of asset purchases raises the observed inequality across
households as measured by their Gini coefficients and quantiles of net wealth, housing wealth,
and financial wealth. Additional counterfactual policy experiments confirm the QE did play
an important role in the widening of the wealth inequality gap. With respect to the pass
through mechanism of UMP shocks, portfolio rebalancing is the most prominent channel in
increasing wealth inequality and as our results show, it is activated through wealth effects
via higher financial asset prices and drops in corporate bond yields.
We also presented evidence of a regressive distributive effect activated through the hous-
ing prices channel. This result contradicts the intuition of theoretical and empirical works
investigating the relationship between monetary policy and wealth inequality that typically
predict housing revaluation effects offsetting the financial asset revaluation effects of UMP
(see for example, Adam and Tzamourani (2016); Lenza and Slacalek (2018); Bunn et al.
(2018)). Our results echo the relatively small share of home-owners in the real wealth dis-
tribution of Great Britain and the effect of UMP on house prices which takes more time
to reveal (Rahal, 2016) compared to the revaluation effect of financial assets. In addition,
we presented evidence in favour of the savings redistribution channel which transfers wealth
from richer savers to poorer borrowers whose balance sheet items track variable interest rates.
Nevertheless, this channel is not strong enough to counterbalance the upward pressures on
inequality driven by the inflationary pressures of the portfolio rebalancing channel and the
housing price channel. Last, as expected, the results reveal that UMP is shown to present
more regressive redistributive effects than CMP. This is most probably due to the existence
22Bagchi et al. (2019) andLeroy and El Herradi (2019) are recent works on these grounds.
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of the portfolio rebalancing channel through large-scale asset purchases that is the major
transmission channel under the zero lower bound.
While our analysis captured a rich set of dynamics, it narrowed its focus to a partial
equilibrium perspective, by evaluating the impact of UMP shocks on wealth distribution
variables rather than focusing on their impact on other welfare measures such as income
or consumption. These measures are most likely affected by UMP in a heterogeneous way,
depending on the income structure and the consumption patterns of the economy. For
instance, (Hohberger et al., 2019) suggests the presence of feedback effects that potentially
arise from monetary policy in general equilibrium, which may not be captured in an empirical
analysis as in the case of a dynamic macroeconomic model. Yet, evidence from Mumtaz and
Theophilopoulou (2017) complements our analysis by providing evidence that QE worsened
income and consumption inequality in the UK, on top of wealth inequalities addressed here.
Taking all the evidence together, the message is that QE measures in the UK worsened
overall economic inequalities.
Our results have important policy implications at a time when major central banks are
moderately switching from unconventional to conventional monetary policy. Although UMP
measures have proven to be a powerful monetary instrument to boost liquidity and investment
when the zero lower bound is binding, they are accompanied with undesirable side effects,
namely widening wealth disparities. Policies that induce regressive redistribution outcomes
may not be desirable for the UK, given the central role of underlying social inequalities on
the rise of populism (Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Piketty, 2018) and possibly on the British
referendum vote to leave the EU (Fetzer, 2018).
Alternatives to UMP have been proposed, including fiscally oriented transfer policies by
crediting (poorer) households with means-tested stipends, refundable tax credits targeted
to poorer families and, unemployment insurance extensions.23 Although the effectiveness
of fiscal transfers in raising output and stabilizing investment under a binding ZLB is still
debated (Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012; Mehrotra, 2018), such measures are likely to have
less regressive side-effects when it comes to wealth redistribution, due to the lower prevalence
of the asset revaluation channel documented in the present study. Thus, the redistributive
effects of fiscal versus monetary policy under the ZLB serve as a straight avenue for future
research. The study of Bivens (2015) focusing on income inequality for the US case is a good
starting point on this research agenda.
Finally, growing theoretical and empirical work suggests that wealth distribution dispari-
ties, on top of being an outcome of monetary policy, functions as a transmission mechanism
of monetary policy to consumption through varying marginal propensities to consume for
different net wealth profiles (Auclert, 2019). Thus, an avenue for future research would be
the investigation of monetary policy-induced inequality as an endogenous variable in the
23See for example Muellbauer (2014) and Baldwin (2016) among others
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monetary policy transmission and its effects on the economy-wide equilibrium.
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Shadow rates and UMP identification
Figure A1. The shadow rate as a proxy of Unconventional Monetary Policy
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Source: Wu and Xia (2016); Krippner (2014), FRED
A1. Time varying VAR model
We use a TV-VAR model in order to conduct a counterfactual policy scenario to measure
the impact of UMP on inequality as described in section 5.5.6. This approach was proposed
by Baumeistera and Benati (2013) who identified a shock to the 10 year government bond
spread in order to examine the macroeconomic effects of a yield spread compression. Consider
again the structural VAR in equation (1) but this time, following Primiceri (2005), the
covariance matrix Σt is decomposed as:
Ωt = A
−1
t Ht
(
A−1t
)′
In our four VAR specification, the time-varying matrices Ht and At are defined as follows:
Ht =

h1,t 0 0 0 0
0 h2,t 0 0 0
0 0 h3,t 0 0
0 0 0 h4,t 0
 and At =

1 0 0 0 0
a21,t 1 0 0 0
a31,t a32,t 1 0 0
a41,t a42,t a43,t 1 0

where Ht is a diagonal matrix of the stochastic volatilities and At is a lower triangular
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matrix which captures the contemporaneous interactions of the endogenous variables. Fol-
lowing Primiceri (2005), the elements of Bi,t, hi,t, aii,t are modeled as random walks. The
advantage of this approach is that we allow for permanent shifts while we reduce the num-
ber of parameters to be estimated in a model which is already heavily parameterized. In
particular, denoting ht = [h1,t, h2,t, h3,t, h4,t]
′ and at = [a21,t, a31,t, . . . a43,t]′, we have that:
lnht = lnht−1 + nt
Bt = Bt−1 + ηt
at = at−1 + τt
where hi,t evolves as a geometric random walk and Bt, at evolve as driftless random walks.
We assume that the vector [εt, ηt, τt, νt]
′ is distributed as:
vt
ηt
τt
nt
 ∼ N (0, V ) , with V =

Σ 0 0 0
0 Q 0 0
0 0 S 0
0 0 0 Z

Estimation of the TV-VAR Model
The model is estimated using Bayesian methods. We describe in what follows the prior
distributions as well as the estimation algorithm.
Prior Distributions
The initial conditions for the VAR coefficients B0 are obtained via an OLS estimate of a
fixed VAR using the first T0 observations and then the prior distribution for B is defined
as B0 ∼ N
[
BˆOLS,, 4xVˆ
(
BˆOLS
)]
. For the prior of h, let ΣˆOLS be the estimated covariance
matrix of νt from the estimation of the time-invariant version of (1) and let K be the lower
triangular Choleski factor under which = KK ′ = ΣˆOLS . The prior is then defined as lnh0 ∼
N (lnµ0, 10xI3) where µ0 is a vector collecting the logarithms of the squared elements on
the diagonal of K. For the prior of the off-diagonal elements of A, we set a0 ∼ N
[
a˜0, V˜ (a˜0)
]
where a˜0 are the off-diagonal elements of ΣˆOLS , where each row scaled by the corresponding
element on the diagonal, while V˜ (a˜0) is a diagonal matrix with each element (i,i) being 10
times the absolute value of the corresponding i-th element.
Regarding the prior distributions for the hyperparameters, the prior of Q is assumed to
be inverse Wishart distribution Q ∼ IW (T0Q,T0). The scale parameter is equal to T0Q,
where Q = ρxΣˆOLS , and ρ = 0.0001. The prior distribution of the elements of S is assumed
to be inverse Wishart Si ∼ IW (Sµ0i , Sv0i) where i indexes the blocks of S where Sµ0i is a
diagonal matrix with the relevant elements of a˜0 multiplied by 10
−3 (see also Mumtaz and
Theophilopoulou (2017) who use this prior specification). Finally, for the variances of the
stochastic volatility innovations, we set an inverse Gamma distribution for the elements of
Z, σ2i ∼ IG
(
σµ0 =
0.0001
2 , σσ0 =
1
2
)
.
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A Gibbs sampling algorithm is used to sample from the posterior distribution. The details
of each conditional distribution are provided below.
1st step; drawing the coefficient states Bt
Conditional on At, HtV , the observation equation 3 is linear with Gaussian innovations and
a known covariance matrix. Therefore, we draw Bt using the Carter and Kohn (1994) algo-
rithm as follows. The conditional posterior distribution of p
(
BT \ Y T , AT , HT , V ) is writ-
ten as p
(
BT \ Y T , AT , HT , V ) = p (BT \ Y T , AT , HT , V ) T−1∏
t=1
p(Bt \ Bt+1, Y T , AT , HT , V ).
The first term on the right hand side equation, i.e. the posterior distribution of Bt is dis-
tributed as p
(
BT \ Y T , AT , HT , V
) ∼ N (BT |T, PT |T). The second element, i.e. the poste-
rior distribution of Bt, is distributed as p
(
Bt \Bt+1, Y T , AT , HT , V
) ∼ N (Bt\t+1, Pt\t+1) .
The simulation proceeds as follows. First we use Kalman filter to draw BT |T, PT |T and
then we proceed backwards in time by using Bt\t+1 = Bt\t + Pt\tP−1t\t+1 (Bt+1 −Bt) and
Pt\t+1 = Pt\t + Pt\tP−1t\t+1Pt\t.
2nd step; draw the covariance states ai
Before describing this step, note that νt, the VAR residuals, can be written as with var (εt) =
Ht. This is a system of linear equations with time varying coefficients and heteroskedasticity
which has a known form. The jth equation of this system is given as νjt = −ajtν−jt + εjt
, where the subscript j denotes the jth column of νt, while −j denotes columns 1 to j − 1.
Note that this is a system of equations with time varying coefficients at. Following Primiceri
(2005), we simplify the analysis by allowing the covariance of τt, S, to be block diagonal,
that is, the shocks to the jth equation τj,t are uncorrelated with those from other equations.
Given this diagonal form, the elements of At can be drawn by using the standard Carter and
Kohn (1994) algorithm.
3rd step; Draw the volatility states, ht
Following Cogley and Sargent (2005), the diagonal elements of Ht are sampled using a
Metropolis Hastings algorithm. To see this, we write the following equation as before,
Atνt = εt, where, var (εt) = Ht. Now, conditional on Bt and At, the distribution of hit
is given by:
f(hit/hit−1hi,t+1,εit) = f (εit \ hit)xf(hit \ hit−1)xf (hit+1 \ hit)
= h−0.5it exp
(−ε2it
2hit
)
xh−1it exp
(−(lnhit−µ)2
2σhi
)
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where µ and σhi denote the mean and variance of the log-normal density h
−1
it exp
(−(lnhit−µ)2
2σhi
)
.
Following Jacquier et al. (2002), we use this log normal density as the candidate generating
density with the acceptance probability defined as the ratio of the conditional likelihood
h−0.5it exp
(−ε2it
2hit
)
at the old and the new draw. This algorithm is applied at each period in
the sample to deliver a draw of the stochastic volatilities.
4th step, draw the hyperparameters, Q,S,Z
Conditional on Bt, At, Ht, we sample the hyperparameters as follows: Q is sampled from
the inverse Wishart distribution using the scale matrix η′tηt + Q0 and degrees of freedom
T + T0. Next, S is sampled from the inverse Gamma distribution with scale parameter
τ ′tτt + Si and degrees of freedom T + T0. Last, we draw the elements of Z from its in-
verse Wishart distribution with scale parameter
(lnhit−lnhit−1)′(lnhit−lnhit−1)+σµ0
2 and degrees
of freedom, T+σσ02 . The algorithm is run for 100,000 iterations discarding the initial 60,000
as burn-in sample.
A2. Threshold VAR
The TVAR is defined as:
yt = c1 +
p∑
j=1
B1jyt−j + vt, vt ∼ N (0,Σ1) , if Yit−d <= Y ∗
yt = c2 +
p∑
j=1
B2jyt−j + t, t ∼ N (0,Σ2) , if Yit−d > Y ∗
(A1)
where Yit−d is the threshold variable which in our case is the shadow rate, d is the time lag
that is assumed to be known and Y ∗ is the threshold level. Based on standard information
criteria, the specification that we follow is a one lag VAR with the threshold variable delayed
by two periods.
Estimation of the TVAR
Following Babura et al. (2010) we introduce a dummy observation prior for the VAR
parameters bi = {ci,Bi}, where i=1,2. The prior means are chosen as the OLS estimates of
the coefficients of an AR(1) regression estimated for each endogenous variable using a training
sample. As is standard in the literature, we set the overall prior tightness λ = 0.1. Next,
we assume that the prior of follows the normal distribution with p (Y ∗) ∼ N (Y¯ ∗, σY ∗) . We
follow Blake et al. (2012) by using the mean of the threshold variable as Y¯ ∗ and the variance
of the series as σY ∗ .
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For simplicity, denoting the right hand side variables of the TVAR as Xi , we can write the
conditional posterior distribution of bi that is standard and follows the normal distribution
as:
H (bi\Σi,yi, Y ∗) ∼ N
[
vec (B∗i ) ,Σi ⊗
(
X∗
′
i X
∗
i
)−1]
(A2)
where B∗i =
(
X∗′i X
∗
i
)−1
X∗′i y
∗
i ) and y
∗
i ,X
*
i denote the transformed data in regime i aug-
mented with the dummy observations that define the prior for the left and the right hand
side of the TVAR respectively. The conditional posterior distribution of Σi is given by the
inverse Wishart distribution:
H (Σi\bi,yi, Y ∗) ∼ IW (S∗i , T ∗i ) (A3)
where S∗i = (y
∗
i −X∗i ∗ bi)′ (y∗i −X∗i ∗ bi) and T ∗i denotes the number of rows in Y ∗.
The Gibbs sampler cycles through the following steps: (i) the parameters are sampled in
each regime according to the conditional posterior distributions A2 and A3. Then, given
the values for coefficients and covariances, (ii) we sample the threshold value, Y ∗ by using a
Metropolis Hastings random walk algorithm as follows.
We draw a new value of the threshold from the random walk process: Y∗new = Y *old +Ψ
1/2e,
e ∼ N (0,Σ) , where Ψ1/2 is a scaling factor that is chosen so as to ensure that the acceptance
rate is in the 2040% interval. Next, we compute the acceptance probability:
a =
F (y\bi,Σi, Y ∗new) p (Y ∗new)
F
(
y\bi,Σi, Y ∗old
)
p
(
Y ∗old
) (A4)
where F (y\bi,Σi, Y ∗new) is the likelihood of the parameters as the product of the likelihoods
in the two regimes. The log likelihood in each regime is defined as: lnF =
(
T
2
)
log
∣∣Σ−1i ∣∣ −
0.5
T∑
t=1
[(Yi,t −Xi,tbi )′Σ−1i (Yi,t −Xi,tbi)] .We then draw u ∼ U (0, 1). If u < a, accept Y ∗new
else retain Y ∗old. We run 100,000 draws and discard the first 60,000 to ensure convergence.
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Additional estimates
Figure B1. Impulse responses of net financial wealth quantiles
Note: The vertical axis of each plot shows the response in percent. Time intervals on the x-axis are months. The pink
line is the median estimate and the green shaded area is the error band.
Figure B2. Impulse responses of net housing wealth quantiles
Note: The vertical axis of each plot shows the response in percent. Time intervals on the x-axis are months. The pink
line is the median estimate and the green shaded area is the error band.
